MAKING WOMEN COUNT - NOT JUST COUNTING WOMEN:

ASSESSING WOMEN’S INCLUSION AND INFLUENCE ON PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

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ACRONYMS

AU  African Union
CA  Constituent Assembly
CEDAW  Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo
EU  European Union
EZLN  Zapatista Army of National Liberation
FMLN  Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
GCC  Gulf Cooperation Council
GFA  Good Friday Agreement
GII  Gender Inequality Index
INGO  International Non-Governmental Organization
MARWOPNET  Mano River Women’s Peace Network
MSU  Mediation Support Unit
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization
NIWC  Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition
OECD  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
SAF  Sister Arab Forum for Human Rights
SCR  Security Council Resolution
SIGI  Social Institutions and Gender Index
WANEP  West Africa Network for Peace Building
WIPNET  Women in Peacebuilding Network
UN  United Nations
UN DPA  United Nations Department of Political Affairs
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNIFEM  United Nations Development Fund for Women
UN Women  United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Fifteen years after the adoption of the landmark UN Security Council resolution 1325, women remain significantly underrepresented in peace and transitional processes. A central challenge is the lack of evidence-based knowledge on the precise role and impact of women’s inclusion on peace processes. When women have been included in the past, it was mainly due to normative pressure applied by women’s groups and their international supporters.

The results of the “Broadening Participation in Political Negotiations and Implementation” project—an ongoing multi-year research project started in 2011 at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland, under the leadership of Dr. Thania Paffenholz—address these empirical knowledge gaps. Comprised of 40 in-depth qualitative case studies, this project examines the role and impact of all actors and groups—in addition to the main conflict parties—included in peace and political transition processes throughout all phases, including post-agreement implementation.

The objective of this report is to present an analysis of women’s inclusion distilled from the larger “Broadening Participation” research project to date, in order to provide UN Women (and other organizations studying women’s inclusion) with direct comparative evidence on women’s influence in previous cases of peace processes since the 1990s.

For the purpose of the research, ‘women’ were defined as organized groups (such as women’s delegations and women’s civil society organizations, networks, or coalitions) participating alongside other actors, such as civil society, political parties, or previously-sidelined armed groups.

KEY FINDINGS

Essentially, the research found that the direct inclusion of women does not per se increase the likelihood that more peace agreements are signed and implemented. What makes a difference is the influence women actually have on a process. In short, making women’s participation count is more important than merely counting the number of women included in peace processes. Six key findings reinforcing this general conclusion are highlighted below:

First, women have made substantial contributions to peacemaking and constitution-making negotiations and to the implementation of final agreements—even if their inclusion is still challenged or met with indifference by many negotiation parties and mediators.

Second, the strength of women’s influence is positively correlated with agreements being reached and implemented. In cases where women’s groups were able to exercise strong influence on a negotiation process, the chances of a final agreement being reached were much higher than in those cases where women’s influence was moderate, weak, or absent in practice. The chances of peace agreements being implemented—i.e. that the resulting peace will be sustained—were also much higher when women’s groups had a stronger influence on the process.

Third, the involvement of women does not weaken peace processes. On the contrary, the presence of women strengthened the influence other additionally included actors (aside from the main conflict parties) had on the peace processes studied. This is because, in the cases analyzed, organized women’s groups pressured for signing peace deals more often than any other group participating in a peace process. Of course, the involvement of women is never the only factor influencing the reaching of agreements—some agreements have also been reached without any involvement by women.
Fourth, women’s inclusion is not limited to direct participation at the negotiation table. Women’s inclusion has occurred in the past through multiple modalities, along several tracks, and throughout the different peace process phases (i.e. pre-negotiation, negotiation, and post-agreement implementation). In any given peace process, several modalities of inclusion may be present either separately or, more often, in parallel to each other during all process phases. Seven modalities of inclusion were identified:

- **Direct representation at the negotiation table:**
  Women’s quotas, as part of selection criteria for negotiation delegations, are often effective in enlarging women’s representation at the table. However, quotas alone do not automatically lead to more women’s influence, as case study research indicates that political party loyalties often trumped genuine women’s interests. Women had much higher chances of exercising influence at the negotiation table when they had their own independent women-only delegation, and/or when they were able to strategically coordinate among women across delegations in order to advance common interests, such as by formulating joint positions on key issues and/or by forming unified women’s coalitions across formal delegations.

- **Observer status:** When women were granted observer status, they could rarely influence the process. No patterns assessing the influence of women as observers emerged; rather, the way in which women were able to use observer status during negotiations varied according to context-specific factors.

- **Consultations:** Setting up formal (i.e. officially endorsed by the mediation team and the negotiating parties) or informal consultative forums to identify key issues, demands, and proposals made by women—in parallel to ongoing peace negotiations—was found to be the most common modality of women’s inclusion in peace and transition processes. However, for such consultations to be influential in practice, establishing clear and effective transfer strategies that systematically communicate results of the consultations to negotiators and mediators is necessary. Overall, women were most influential within consultations when able to formulate joint women’s positions on key issues. Joint positions were then presented, often in concise documents, to explain women’s demands to the main negotiating parties, which then were either formally obliged or informally pressured to consider this input in the drafting of a final peace agreement.

- **Inclusive commissions:** These were found to be a common mechanism of participation for women in all peace process phases. There are generally three types of commissions: those established to prepare and conduct peace and transition processes, post-agreement commissions (e.g. transitional justice mechanisms, ceasefire monitoring, constitution-drafting), and permanent commissions that endure in the long-term. Particularly in post-agreement commissions, women’s inclusion was mostly the result of gender-sensitive provisions already written into the peace agreement. Securing women’s participation in all commissions across all phases of a peace process requires explicit gender equality provisions (such as specific quotas) to be introduced as early as possible, in order to be present in the language of a final peace agreement.

- **Problem-solving workshops:** Women were found to be highly underrepresented in these processes. Exceptions to this general finding occurred when workshops were specifically designed for women, as a means of overcoming political tensions and grievances. Such cases often resulted in the formulation of joint positions, which then increased women’s overall influence.

- **Public decision-making:** In some cases, negotiated peace agreements or new constitutions are put to public vote (e.g. in the form of a national referendum). Reliable gender-disaggregated data on voting patterns are often lacking. When such data were available, it was found that the voting patterns of women did not differ from those of men. However, women’s groups have successfully launched public nation-wide electoral mobilization campaigns in favor of voting to approve a peace deal, as was the case for instance in Northern Ireland.
• **Mass action**: More than any other group, women have organized mass action campaigns in favor of peace deals. They have pressured conflict parties to start negotiations and eventually sign peace agreements. Women have also undertaken mass action campaigns to push their way into official processes that exclude them.

Fifth, a specific set of process and context factors work hand in hand to either enable or constrain the ability of women to participate and exercise influence.

There are nine main process factors affecting the ability of women to participate and have an influence in peace processes:

• **Selection criteria and procedures** determine the groups that will be included in a process, and identify group members that will be able to influence negotiation outcomes. Women were only able to exercise meaningful influence when gender-sensitive procedures were already in place for the selection of participants.

• **Decision-making procedures** establish the means by which the preferences of different actors are validated across the peace process. Decision-making procedures can make the crucial difference between nominal and meaningful participation, and are relevant across multiple modalities. In fact, women’s opportunities to make an impact can be substantially limited—even if they are included in high numbers—without procedures explicitly enabling them to influence the decision-making process.

• **Coalition-building** allows women, under a collective umbrella, to mobilize around common issues and negotiate as a unified, representative cluster, which increases the chance of being heard. Overcoming differences and sharing grievances was often a precondition for these coalitions to function.

• **Transfer strategies** ensure that the inputs given from actors outside of the negotiation table find their way into the agreement and the peace process as a whole. These mechanisms are particularly important for modalities of inclusion outside the negotiation table. For women, the creation of a joint position paper or common policy document proved especially useful in gaining influence.

• **Inclusion-friendly mediators** provide strong and supportive leadership in peace negotiations, and are a major enabling factor ensuring meaningful women’s inclusion. Strong and supportive guidance by these actors played a decisive role in supporting women during the peace process.

• **Early inclusion in the peace process** can set a precedent that then ensures the continuous involvement of women’s groups and increases their ability to make meaningful contributions. Early women’s involvement—preferably in the pre-negotiation phase—has often paved the way for sustained women’s inclusion throughout subsequent negotiations and agreement implementation processes. All case studies showed that the international community tends to pay the most attention during the negotiation phase.

• **Support structures** prior to, during, and after negotiations allow women to make more effective and higher quality contributions to a process. In past cases, support structures strengthened women’s roles and influence during peace negotiations and in the subsequent implementation of final agreements.

• **Monitoring** is a key activity during the implementation of a peace agreement. However, women’s role in monitoring was generally found to be weak. Even in the strong cases—i.e. when women had strong influence in negotiations and were able to include many provisions in the final agreement and to secure a gender quota for key implementation bodies—monitoring of the implementation of these achievements was rarely conducted.

• **Funding** is a means to facilitate action, and it becomes particularly relevant with regard to informal inclusion modalities. Funding can support the preparedness of women, provide beneficial support structures and allows them to act flexibly and independently. It can particularly enhance the participation of women by providing for the basic preconditions of participation.

The other set of relevant factors are context factors, which may not only enable and constrain women’s inclusion, but also shape the trajectories of peace
processes as such. These factors include: elite support or resistance; public buy-in; regional and international actor’s influence on a peace process; presence of strong women’s groups; preparedness of women; heterogeneity of women’s identities; societal and political attitudes and expectations surrounding gender roles; regional and international women’s networks and the existence of prior commitments to gender sensitivity and women’s inclusion.

When women were found to be influential in a particular multi-stakeholder negotiation process, it was often because they pushed for more concrete and fundamental reforms. Four issues were commonly pushed by women’s organizations in the different peace processes analyzed: 1) the cessation of hostilities and agreements on long-term ceasefires, and/or pressure to start new (or continue stalled) peace negotiations; 2) the signing of peace agreements—here, women exerted pressure both from within or outside formal negotiations; 3) enhanced women’s representation in the ongoing peace process, as well as in the political structure of the post-conflict state; and 4) additional gender-sensitive political and legal reforms (e.g. demanding changes to laws governing land ownership, inheritance, or healthcare), transitional justice issues (e.g. addressing any gender-based violence and human rights violations that occurred during the conflict, or demanding truce and reconciliation commissions), and post-conflict reconstruction concerns (e.g. equal access to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs for women, and/or child soldiers where applicable).
1. INTRODUCTION

In 2000, the United Nations Security Council passed a landmark resolution (1325) stressing the importance of women’s “equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.” Seven more resolutions on Women, Peace and Security have followed; yet most negotiation parties and many mediators still do not regard the inclusion of women and gender issues as an essential component in the process of negotiating and implementing peace and transition agreements. This attitude persists despite the previous success of women’s groups in contributing to reaching peace agreements and their implementation, and despite extensive lobbying by UN Women and other international and local organizations for greater women’s participation. A central problem is the lack of evidence-based knowledge on the modalities of women’s inclusion, and their impact on peace and other political transition processes (negotiations and beyond). As a consequence, political negotiations and peace processes are often designed on the basis of untested hypotheses and normative arguments, instead of on the basis of empirical evidence and analysis of when, how, and under what conditions women’s inclusion can work effectively.

Led by Dr. Thania Paffenholz, the multi-year “Broadening Participation” research project, conducted at the Geneva-based Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, has studied questions of broader inclusion. Employing a comparative case study approach, the project has investigated 40 in-depth qualitative peace and transition case studies analyzing peace negotiations and agreement implementation (see list of case studies between 1989 and 2014 in annex 1). The project focused on all groups of relevant actors, including women as a distinct group, in addition to the main conflict parties involved in peace and transition processes. In particular, this research project examined the actions of these additional groups within seven inclusion modalities. These modalities are comprehensive, encompassing official and non-official roles, both at the negotiating table and more distant to it [i.e. through consultations and other modalities (see chapter 2)].

The terms ’participation’ and ’inclusion’ are used interchangeably in this report, and refer to taking part in an official peacemaking or constitution-making process within a formal inclusion modality either before negotiations, at the negotiation table, in parallel to official negotiations, or after negotiations during the implementation phase.

Concerning women, the project mostly focuses on the participation of organized women’s groups, networks, or coalitions operating within the aforementioned inclusion modalities. The decision to focus on organized women’s groups as the central unit of analysis
was not a deliberate choice. Rather, it resulted from the fact that the “Broadening Participation” project analyzed the influences and contributions of those actors included in a process in addition to the main conflict parties, instead of taking a numeric approach of counting frequency rates of participation. Doing so revealed that women’s visible contributions mostly occurred when women were present in some sort of organized form, be it as an independent women’s delegation or through women’s civil society organizations, networks, or more loosely-formed coalitions. The project did not examine the role of women as mediators or negotiators.

The report is structured in seven chapters. After this introduction, the second chapter provides a brief overview of the project’s methodology. The third chapter analyzes why inclusion happened in the case studies and who initiated it. Subsequently, chapter four examines the impact of women’s inclusion, highlighting the quantitative findings on reaching and sustaining agreements. Chapter five, the main body of the report, presents the qualitative findings on women’s participation across tracks and phases of peace processes and analyzes the inclusion of women in the seven inclusion modalities identified. Chapter six identifies and discusses all the major process and context factors enabling and constraining the quality of women’s participation. The conclusion then recapitulates major findings. Throughout the report, several boxes extracted from the 40 case studies illustrate the findings. A list of these cases and the research framework for the project is provided in the annex.
2. METHODOLOGY

Research focus

The “Broadening Participation” project (BP project) has been designed to investigate inclusion in peace processes and political transitions. The project aims to capture a dynamic understanding of inclusive negotiations, establishing how and under what conditions included actors participate and influence political negotiation processes and their implementation. It thus turns the focus of debate away from the inclusion-exclusion dichotomy that had characterized previous research and policy debates (Paffenholz 2014a).

The BP project categorizes inclusion in peace and transition processes according to seven inclusion modalities (Paffenholz, 2014a; Paffenholz, 2014b). These modalities describe the range of possible formats through which actors other than the principal negotiating parties have been included into formal and informal negotiation processes. The negotiation processes studied in the BP project encompass peace negotiations, political transitions, and constitution-making processes, including the pre-negotiation phase and the implementation of any resulting agreements. The principal negotiating parties were defined as those actors with an independent veto power over the negotiations, and hence without whom negotiations could not take place. For example, in the case of an interstate armed conflict, the governments/leaders of both states would constitute the principal negotiating parties, while in civil wars it is usually the government and its main armed contenders. Included actors were defined as any individuals or groups aside from these principal negotiating parties taking part in one or more of the inclusion modalities.

Phases

The project began in 2011 with the exploration of inclusion modalities in the theoretical and empirical literature and the development of a framework to conduct a rigorous comparative case study analysis. In 2013/2014 the framework was applied to 40 in-depth qualitative case studies. During the second half of 2014 and the first half of 2015, the data produced during the case study phase was analyzed. A comparative case study approach was applied to analyze the data using mainly qualitative but also quantitative methods.

Research framework

The research framework included an analysis of the context, including the conflict and peace or transition process (not all cases involved armed conflict), in order to identify the social and political ruptures and major grievances that precipitated the negotiation process. The second part of the framework focused on the investigation of the occurrence and functioning of the seven modalities during the time period under study. Data has been collected on which actors were present in which modalities, how and why they had been included, the procedures of participation in each modality (including how work was allocated, how decisions were taken), as well as how information, demands and resolutions were transferred to the official negotiation process. This allowed for assessing the influence of the included actors on the negotiation process, outcome and implementation. The research framework also included a focus on the inclusion and influence of women, among other actors.

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2 The modalities applied in the BP project were first described in Paffenholz, 2014. In this publication nine modalities were described. This number was later reduced to seven through the consolidation of the various consultative forums under a single category.

3 Case study research benefited from cooperation with Dr. Esra Çuhadar at Bilkent University in Ankara and her team as well as with Tufts University in Boston.
Women in negotiation processes: Definitions

Women were one of the distinct groups included in peace, transition, and constitution-making processes that the BP project identified. For the purpose of this research, women were defined as more or less organized groups, such as delegations of women, women civil society organizations, networks or coalitions. (Women’s) delegations are defined as groups of actors set up for the specific purpose of inclusion into a negotiation or implementation process. Women civil society organizations are defined as having the following criteria: they are voluntary organizations interacting in the public sphere whose objectives, interests, and ideologies focus mainly on gender and women’s issues. Coalitions are made up of different women coming together out of concern for a specific cause or issue, and networks are considered interconnected coalitions of different women’s organizations. The project also studied the role of quotas, which allocate a certain percentage of all delegate places in a negotiation process to women. According to these definitions, 28 out of 40 cases had a measurable involvement of women.

Type of case studies and their selection

Cases were defined as official high-level political negotiations encompassing the pre-negotiation, negotiation and implementation phase (if any), i.e. a case study constitutes a negotiation case and not a country. Hence, in countries with more than one high-level official negotiation, the BP project either chose to study only one negotiation case or else included

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**Figure 1**

Modalities of Inclusion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Direct representation at the negotiation table</th>
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<tr>
<td>a. Inclusion within negotiation delegations</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Enlarging the number of negotiation delegations</td>
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<tr>
<td>(i.e. including a separate women’s delegation)</td>
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| 2. Observer status                              |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. Consultations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Official Consultations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Non or semi-official Consultations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Public Consultations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>4. Inclusive commissions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Post-agreement commissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Commissions preparing/conducting peace processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Permanent Commissions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 5. High-level problem-solving workshops         |

| 6. Public decision-making (i.e. referendum)    |

| 7. Mass action                                 |

---
more than one case study per country (see annex with list of case studies). The case studies were selected to provide data on different types of peacemaking, constitution making and major political reforms leading to political transitions, to cover a range of geographic regions, and featuring at least two modalities of inclusion. One of the cases began in the 1980s, 22 began in the 1990s, 15 began in the 2000s, and two began in the 2010s. Seventeen of the country cases are located in Africa, thirteen in Asia, four in Latin America, three in Europe, and three in Oceania. The project did not analyze exclusion cases (i.e. cases solely featuring the track 1 parties) as the goal was to better understand inclusive negotiation processes. Nilsson (2012) had already studied whether exclusive or inclusive processes contributed to more durable peace settlements, and found that the inclusion of civil society actors reduced the risk of peace agreements failing (See Annex 1).

Data collection

Data collection for case studies was carried out using secondary and primary data sources as well as in-depth interviews with mediators, negotiators and included actors involved in these negotiations and academics with experience in the countries or contexts of the case studies. Access to mediators, negotiators, and included actors was facilitated by academic networks, but was also greatly assisted by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Conciliation Resources, the Crisis Management Initiative, as well as the UN Mediation Support Units at the UN Department of Political Affairs and the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) Conflict Prevention Centre, and the Governments of Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey. All case studies were subject to an internal and external review process. Case experts and practitioners served as external reviewers.

Data analysis

The case studies were comparatively analyzed along the categories of the research framework supported by a software programme for qualitative data assessment. This allowed for the assessment of women’s presence, activities, roles, procedural issues and influence on the process in different inclusion modalities, as well as enabling or constraining factors regarding women’s presence and influence. Thereafter, women’s presence and influence were analyzed regarding their correlation to the outcome of negotiations, i.e. agreement reached or not and degree of implementation. The methodologies for assessing influence and computing the correlations are described below.

Assessing influence

To compare, analyze and rate women’s influence on the negotiations across cases, researchers assessed women’s influence within the inclusion modalities.
along the project’s definition of influence (see box 2.1 above). The influence of women was assessed on a four-level ordinal scale – ranging from ‘no influence’ to ‘very strong positive influence’. A weak influence of women was defined as bringing only some items onto the negotiation agenda or trying to push for negotiations to begin or for an agreement to be signed in a limited manner. A strong influence of women was defined as bringing several significant issues onto the agenda and proposals for an agreement, or strongly pushing for negotiations to begin or for an agreement to be signed. Hence, the influence of women was not assessed in terms of their impact on the text of the agreement itself, but on the negotiation agenda or specific proposals advanced during negotiations. This means that women's influence was based on their activities to influence the agreement and its implementation, and not assessed against whether or not an agreement was finally reached or implemented.

In cases where the information about women’s influence was judged to be too weak to analyze, women’s influence was coded as missing. Two teams of researchers independently evaluated this variable for all cases and any discrepancies were investigated in consultation with case study authors as well as independent experts.

### Correlations of influence and agreements reached and implemented

The outcome categories in the negotiation processes measured whether an agreement was reached and to what extent that agreement was implemented. All cases were classified according to whether an agreement was reached or not. Cases in which an agreement was reached were further classified according to what extent the agreement was then implemented.

Cases in which none or few of the provisions were implemented after five years were classified as 'not implemented'; cases where some provisions were implemented but major provisions were not yet addressed were classified as 'partially implemented'; and cases where most provisions were fully implemented were classified as 'fully implemented'.

The 'influence of women' variable was cross-tabulated with the outcome variables identified above (agreement reached and implementation levels) to identify correlations between them. Statistical tests have been run to identify the significance and the strength of the associations between variables (Chi-square; Kendall-tau b).
3.

WOMEN’S INCLUSION: A CONTESTED AFFAIR

The “Broadening Participation” research project found that the participation of women in peace processes was often a contested affair, rarely perceived as a natural and obvious element of proceedings. Women’s inclusion was nearly always initiated for normative reasons, and met with indifference and resistance in the cases studied. Main conflict parties or negotiation parties hardly ever took active steps to include women in the peace process. Instead, women had to rely on their own efforts to be included (see Box 3.1), or were forced to rely on external support of the international community and third party mediators in order to secure participation.

BOX 3.1

Inclusion Pushed for by Women

Somalia Arta Peace Process, 1999

Women in Somali society have traditionally been excluded from the political sphere, and the early deliberations of the 1999 Arta peace process reflected this. Decision-making power rested in the hands of the male elders from the five traditionally dominant Somali clans. The leaders of the five clans intended to structure the peace accord in a way that distributed power along clan lines, but a number of female delegates realized that a peace process based strictly on the traditional Somali clan structure would essentially exclude women from decision-making. Consequently, of the 100 female delegates present, 92 formed a joint women’s coalition to transcend clan lines and vote as a single bloc. In doing so, these women effectively initiated their own inclusion as a group based on gender identity. This so-called ‘sixth clan’ was able to bring about the creation of a national charter that reserved 25 seats in the 245-member Transitional Assembly for women, and also negotiated guarantees to protect the human rights of children, women and minorities.

There are many possible explanations for understanding why conflict parties and mediators included some actors as opposed to others. For instance, civil society organizations or political parties have been included for a range of strategic reasons mostly related to attempts to overcome lack of legitimacy and ensure public buy-in in support of the overall peace process. Aside from these political reasons, mediators who pushed for inclusion often did so in order to gain momentum for peace negotiations, to generate new perspectives as a way to broaden negotiation agendas, or to test new ideas. Nevertheless, there seems to be general awareness and acknowledgement among mediation teams of the international normative frameworks that stipulate women’s inclusion and participation in peace processes and political transitions (see Box 3.2).
In societies where women do not generally play a prominent role, and where gender-sensitive provisions and women’s rights remain contentious issues, women’s participation is often met with resistance. Conflict parties have resisted women’s participation in a variety of ways ranging from questioning the independence and legitimacy of their participation to direct harassment and serious threats in some cases (see Box 3.3).

In a number of cases, resistance to women’s inclusion has been overcome with the strong support of external mediation teams, as well as other involved third parties, including international actors. In cases where women had previously accumulated traditional authority and experience in dispute settlement and conflict resolution, their later participation in a peace process tended to be more openly accepted and acknowledged (see Box 3.4 and Box 3.5).

BOX 3.2
Mediators Supported Women’s Inclusion
Burundi, 1996-2013
Mediators were also found to initiate women’s inclusion in formal peace processes. During the peace process in Burundi, women’s groups initially lobbied for inclusion in formal negotiations but were flatly rejected by the government delegation. However, the Tanzanian mediation team, headed at the time by Julius Nyerere, supported the principle of women’s inclusion. Although unable to secure direct representation at the table, Nyerere managed to negotiate observer status for women’s groups in the process.

BOX 3.3
Resistance to Women’s Inclusion
Yemen, 2013-2014
At the Comprehensive National Dialogue Conference for a New Yemen, women benefitted from a 30 per cent quota in formal negotiating delegations throughout the conference. Women also formed a separate, independent delegation with 40 reserved seats. Despite these encouraging conditions, female delegates faced serious challenges as the social and political environment was not favorable to women’s participation.

Traditional actors, along with fundamental religious movements, opposed demands by women and youth that challenged cultural practices and historical narratives. Gender issues and women’s rights not only proved to be highly contentious issues in discussions during the National Dialogue Conference, but women delegates were also in many cases publicly threatened for participating, and even physically attacked. There are reports about female delegates being singled out by name and in pictures on the internet calling them ‘dishonorable’ for going to dialogue meetings unaccompanied and at night.

To counter those dynamics, women’s human rights organizations, such as the Sisters Arab Forum for Human Rights (SAF), and the UN Special Adviser and his team increased their efforts to support and encourage women to participate and raise issues they cared about. Importantly, there were also several NGOs that supported the women by facilitating workshops and providing training sessions. This allowed women to participate in a meaningful way despite the adverse sociocultural climate.
**BOX 3.4**

**Inclusion Pushed for by International Actors**

Darfur Negotiations, 2006

The 2006 Darfur peace negotiations led by the African Union (AU) in Abuja, prior to the Djibouti process, illustrates how women’s inclusion can also be pushed for by international actors other than external mediators. While mediators brought together male representatives of rebel groups from the diaspora, the Canadian Special Envoy to the talks, Senator Mobina S.B. Jaffer, questioned the AU chief mediator as to why there were no women involved. After a positive response from the AU chief mediator, women from Darfur refugee camps were included. Their inclusion added substantial value to the talks, as the women understood the problems on the ground and needs of the civilian population much better than diaspora rebel groups.

**BOX 3.5**

**Inclusion Pushed for by Conflict Parties**

Papua New Guinea Bougainville Negotiations, 1997-2005

Although rare, the inclusion of women in peace negotiations pushed for by conflict parties did sometimes occur. At the Papua New Guinea-Bougainville peace negotiations, the women’s coalition—dubbed the “Women of Bougainville”—was one of the three main groups included at the negotiation table (alongside the local warring parties and the Council of Elders). The women’s coalition had an active presence in the high-level negotiations and decision-making processes, and also signed the main Peace Agreement in 2001. The main warring parties readily accepted the legitimacy of women’s participation because of their important roles in traditional dispute-settlement practices and in locally-generated peace efforts prior to the beginning of the formal peace process. In general, the domestic political environment displayed a high degree of support for a peaceful settlement and for the role women played throughout this process.
4. MAKING WOMEN COUNT, NOT JUST COUNTING WOMEN

A great deal of lobbying effort by women and gender advocates centers on ‘counting’ the number of women in official delegations at the formal negotiating table. However, the findings of the “Broadening Participation” research project show the importance of understanding the difference between mere numerical presence of women and the actual influence women had on peace processes. Evidence from the case studies points to the reality that even when women had a good number of representatives at the negotiation table, they were not necessarily able to assert a strong influence (see Box 4.1). A ‘frequency count’ or ‘head count’ of female participants provides merely the number of women that were present—in practice, this is not a primary determinant of their actual influence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influence of Women in the Process</th>
<th>Ongoing negotiations</th>
<th>No agreement reached</th>
<th>Agreement reached/ No implementation</th>
<th>Agreement reached/ Partial implementation</th>
<th>Agreement reached/ Implementation</th>
<th>Agreement reached/ Ongoing implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None to Weak</td>
<td>Aceh; Colombia; Georgia/Abkhazia; Moldova; Cyprus</td>
<td>Rwanda; Turkey; Armenia; Israel; Palestine – Geneva process</td>
<td>Israel Palestine – Oslo; Mali</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Turkish – Kurdish; Egypt; Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Eritrea; Somalia I; Somalia II; Darfur; Somalia III; Togo</td>
<td>Solomon Islands; Macedonia; Nepal</td>
<td>Afghanistan; Benin; El Salvador</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>Guatemala; Mexico (Chiapas); Burundi; Mali; Northern</td>
<td>DR Congo; Kenya; Liberia; Northern Ireland; Papua New Guinea; Somalia; Malaysia; South Africa</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Case is an approximate timeline. Arrows represent inclusion modalities at approximate degrees of remove from the track 1 negotiation process (in grey)*
It is the influence women can assert on the process that can make a difference for reaching and implementing agreements. The “Broadening Participation” project found that stronger influence of women on peace processes is positively correlated with more agreements reached and implemented. **In cases where women were able to exercise a strong influence on the negotiation process, the chances of agreements being reached were much higher than when women’s groups could only exercise moderate or weak/no influence.**

Although the involvement of women is obviously not the only factor influencing the reaching of agreements (see chapter 6 on enabling and constraining factors), this correlation is important and strong statistically.6

Table 1 below shows the degree of influence women had within the different cases and the negotiation/implementation outcome of the case.

Interestingly, there is no correlation between strong involvement of women and the score on the UNDP’s

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6 This correlation between women’s influence and reaching agreements is not only statistically significant at the confidence level of 95 per cent% (Chi square test), but also of medium strength with 0.4 (kendall-tau b).

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**BOX 4.1**

**Quantity versus Quality of Women’s Involvement – The Importance of Influence in Nepal and Northern Ireland**

In Nepal (2008), women’s participation in the Constituent Assembly (CA) was boosted by the adoption of a quota system, which led to 197 women out of a total of 601 CA members. Women comprised almost 33 per cent of the total CA. They were also represented in a number of the CA’s thematic committees.

However, the overall influence of women in the CA was weak as increased representation did not have a commensurate impact on their influence. On the one hand, there was huge resistance among major political parties (mainly male political actors) to challenging inequality and to discussing women’s issues and gender sensitivity. For example, male political elites undermined the inclusive decision-making processes by organizing close-door informal meetings that excluded women. On the other hand, the influence women could assert was also affected by their lack of collective voice. In an effort to enhance their ability to advocate for women’s issues and to develop a common agenda, female CA members formed a women’s caucus. However, such efforts failed because, ultimately, party loyalties proved to be more compelling. These dynamics limited the impact of women despite their large numbers and illustrate that when women are divided over crucial issues and lack a common goal, this often translates into weak overall influence – even when an advantageous quota system is in place.

By contrast, in Northern Ireland during the negotiations for the Good Friday Agreement (1998) the top ten political parties represented at the negotiation table had no female representation at all. That was the trigger for several women leaders to form a separate women’s political party, the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC), which won support and gained a seat next to the other parties at the negotiation table. Although the NIWC did not have signatory power in the end and was outnumbered by male-dominated parties, their decision-making power was enhanced because they were negotiating at the same level as the other political parties and were able to push for the inclusion of gender issues, many of which made it into the final agreement. The NWIC pushed for equality, human rights, and broad inclusion. They promoted an inclusive, cooperative process, and put women’s participation and women’s rights at the top of the political agenda. The NIWC also focused on preventative measures for violence, specifically addressing prosecutions of cases of violence against women.
Gender Inequality Index (GII). In fact, our research found that those countries with the best scores in this index were the ones with low to no participation of women in a peace process, while those countries with low index scores actually featured a greater impact of women in peace processes. We suggest three explanations: first, the gender gap index might not be the best index to assess these issues, as it does not provide any data for women in conflict-affected countries. In this regard, the OECD’s Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) might be better suited. Second, in countries with a particularly high gender gap, the international community makes a concentrated effort to attempt the introduction of a multitude of women’s empowerment programs supporting women’s rights organizations. Third, a few extremely active women’s groups can make a significant difference, as seen in a number of case studies where these women became leaders of movements.

The study found that where women wielded strong influence, there was recurrence of four specific types of actions and issues being brought to the peace process:

- **Cessation of hostilities and/or pressure for starting or continuing peace negotiations**: In several cases during the pre-negotiation phase, women’s groups participated in actions intended to bring parties to the table. Once in the negotiation phase, women’s groups often pressured parties to return to, or remain at the table when proceedings stalled or reached an impasse. These actions, by pushing for the resolution of the peace process as a whole, directly affected its overall quality.

- **Pressure for signing peace agreements from within or outside of the negotiations**: In several cases women pushed the main parties to the conflict into signing an agreement. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (1999) and Liberia (2003), for example, women literally blocked the doors of the negotiation room until the men inside signed the agreement.

- **Greater representation of women in the peace process**: Women’s groups commonly pursued greater representation of women throughout the peace process, especially across the negotiation and implementation phases. In a number of processes women’s groups actively worked towards the further inclusion of women, often by demanding a gender quota. From greater representation in negotiations to mandatory positions in transitional assemblies, inclusive commissions or legislatures, whenever women’s groups had influence this was reflected in guarantees of women’s inclusion not only during the negotiation process but also in post-conflict/post-agreement political institutions.

- **Gender-awareness provisions**: Women’s groups were likely to advocate for the inclusion of gender-awareness provisions in peace agreements. Their participation repeatedly led to pushing for specific gender-aware processes and provisions. These processes and provisions were often related to addressing the special needs of vulnerable groups of society in conflict and post-conflict situations. Importantly, peace processes featuring women’s participation were far more likely to have these issues successfully raised and implemented than processes without women’s participation. The research project also indicates that the more influence women had on the process, the more specific these gender provisions were.

These findings show that the ability of women’s groups to exert influence has positive and wide-ranging benefits for peace processes. Yet, the study also found that opportunities for women to do so were often limited. The capacity of women to exercise meaningful influence was strongly affected by several enabling and constraining factors occurring in different phases of peace processes and within specific modalities of inclusion. These factors are the focus of Chapter 6.

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7 For more information, see: http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii
8 For more information, see: http://www.genderindex.org/
5. INCLUSION MODALITIES IN DIFFERENT PHASES OF PEACE PROCESSES

Those pushing for the inclusion of women have thus far excessively focused on the negotiating table as the main track of the peace process. However, according to the “Broadening Participation” research project, the negotiation table is neither the only modality for participation nor should it be seen as a single entry point for women’s participation. Rather, the formal ‘negotiation table’ itself may be comprised of multiple entry points permitting women’s engagement to manifest itself in different ways.

FIGURE 2: Inclusion Models in Different Phases of a Negotiation Process

CASE STUDY: NEGOTIATION BETWEEN EZLN AND GOVT. OF MEXICO

Pre-negotiation | Negotiation | Agreement | Implementation and long term

Track 1. Cathedral Dialogues
- The Cathedral Dialogues was the first meeting after the Chiapas rebellion.
- Agenda items amounted to a commitment to discuss terms at a later date.

San Andres Dialogues
- Indigenous women’s delegations attended as part of the approx. 100 intellectual, activists and representatives of indigenous organizations advising the EZLN

Via Parallela
- The Via Parallela was an attempt to restart negotiations after they had stalled.

Mass Mobilization
- Supporters of the Zapatistas/EZLN within Chiapas pressured for peaceful negotiations.

Public Consultations
- The National Poll for Peace and Democracy invited voters in Mexico to vote on a number of agenda items related to San Andres Dialogues as well as the future of EZLN

Unofficial Consultations
- The Special Forum for The Reform of the State
- This consultative forum invited approximately 150 representatives from a huge variety of backgrounds.

Mass Mobilization
- Ongoing civil society mobilisation in Mexico pressured the government to negotiate peacefully with the EZLN

Unofficial Consultations
- The National Forum for Indigenous Rights
- This consultative forum invited 178 indigenous organizations, with many women delegates among these, to advise the EZLN negotiators.

Inclusive Commission
- COCOPA was created to facilitate the continuation of dialogue between the EZLN and the government of Mexico

*Case is an approximate timeline. Arrows represent inclusion modalities at approximate degrees of remove from the track 1 negotiation process (in grey)*
Women may be part of official negotiation delegations (i.e. as representatives of a main conflict party) or may have an independent women-only delegation that acts alongside other official delegations. They can also be granted observer status at the negotiation table, or can play different roles in sub-committees or technical committees during the negotiations. Furthermore, formal negotiations (often referred to as ‘track 1’ processes) are not the only ‘tracks’ that may be present in contemporary peace processes. Other levels of peace processes (i.e. tracks 1.5, 2, and 3) may unfold before, in parallel to, or after, formal track 1 negotiations begin. Women’s inclusion and participation in these complementary ‘tracks’ alongside the formal negotiation table may occur through a variety of potentially relevant inclusion modalities (see the modalities in Chapter 2).

The 1994-1997 peace negotiations in Mexico show how the various inclusion modalities are not mutually exclusive, and how there may be multiple opportunities and entry points for women during peace negotiation processes (Figure 2). In its negotiations with the Government of Mexico, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) used a wide variety of inclusion modalities to pressure the government to start and continue negotiations, to increase its legitimacy, and to generate novel inputs for their negotiating delegates.
The negotiation process is typically divided into three phases: pre-negotiation, negotiation, and implementation. Figure 3 below illustrates how most modalities can occur in all three phases, although all but three modalities predominantly appear during negotiations. Another important finding is that multiple modalities can occur across multiple phases. When modalities occurred more than once in the same phase, they were counted once.

The following section discusses each of the seven inclusion modalities and explains their forms and functioning during the phases in which they may occur.

Modality 1: Direct representation at the negotiation table

The modality of direct representation refers to women’s presence at the negotiation table. Direct representation most commonly occurs during the negotiation phase, though sometimes dialogue processes occur as part of the implementation of an earlier agreement, as in Afghanistan with the two Loya Jirgas that were held after the 2001 Bonn Agreement. Women may also be included as part of a transitional government, as was the case after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Liberia in 2003.

Women can be included in the official negotiation delegations of the main conflict parties or have a delegation in their own right alongside other parties. Having more groups at the table is usually made possible through working groups, sub-committees or technical committees dealing with specific issues.

When women were part of broad-based constitution-making processes, they formed part of official delegations to negotiate new constitutions and were in a few cases even acknowledged as an independent group on the basis of their identity as women. Many of these constitution-making processes followed exclusive official peace talks, as in Nepal or Yemen (see box 5.2). In both cases, the peace deals included only the main armed parties to the conflict. However, the subsequent constitution-making processes were designed in an inclusive manner.

**BOX 5.1**

**Increasing the Number of Women within Official Peace Negotiation Delegations**

**The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 1999-2003**

During the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (1999-2003), initially there were only six women out of 362 delegates participating in the negotiations. Women were able to increase their participation from six to 40 women delegates in Sun City after an intervention by the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and local women’s groups. They organized a workshop to foster women’s participation, and those initial six female delegates issued an open letter insisting on an increase in female participation. In their letter, these women justified their demands for greater representation by citing the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the 2000 UNSC Resolution 1325.

**BOX 5.2**

**Inclusive Constitution-Making**


The Nepali Constituent Assembly has been the most inclusive body of its kind so far in Asia. The electoral system included quotas for women and marginalized communities to guarantee greater inclusiveness. When legislative elections were held in 2008, the country had adopted a legislative gender quota guaranteeing that at least 33 per cent of the Assembly’s seats would go to women.

In 2013, during the Yemeni National Dialogue Conference, a 30 per cent gender quota was established for all negotiation delegations, and women’s civil society groups were also recognized as an independent delegation and granted 40 reserved seats out of 365 seats.
way. When it comes to women's influence at the negotiation table, comparative case study research found that women's quotas—as part of selection criteria for negotiation delegations—have proven effective to enlarge women's representation in the past. However, quotas alone did not automatically lead to greater women's influence because party loyalties often trumped shared women's interests. Women had much higher chances of exercising influence at the negotiation table when they had their own women-only delegation and/or when they were able to strategically coordinate among women across delegations in order to advance common interests, such as by formulating joint positions on key issues, and/or by forming unified women's coalitions across formal delegations. However, women also needed to be part of decision-making bodies at the table in order to exert influence.

Modality 2: Observer status

Observers have no official role, but do gain a direct presence during the negotiations (Paffenholz 2014b). This modality mostly occurs during the negotiation phase, both in peacemaking and constitution-making negotiations. Given that they are physically located in the same room, observers are typically well-informed about the negotiation agenda. As a result of this first-hand knowledge, mediators may employ observers to take on a critical watchdog function, to informally advise them and the negotiating conflict parties if/when needed, and to form alliances with other observer groups to help facilitate a final agreement. Observer status allows the possibility for included groups to maintain normative and/or political pressure on the conflict parties, or to lobby for new issues to be added to the negotiation agenda (i.e. agenda-setting).

Granting women observer status was found to be a common approach facilitating women's inclusion, although it was not the most recurrent among all seven inclusion modalities.

There are also disadvantages associated with this modality—namely, potential obstacles related to selection, representation, and the sidelining of observers in practice. Only a few groups will be granted observer status in a peace process, and their selection is a crucial aspect of ensuring their meaningful participation. In many cases, included groups gained recognition and legitimacy to participate as observers due to the relevance of their work in the pre-negotiation period or to their closeness to the main parties.

In addition, because of the typically small number of observers, they will never be fully representative. There is also the common risk that observers may be seen as being co-opted. Whether and how such issues regarding the selection of observers or their broader representativeness affects the ability of women to influence the process is highly context dependent. In particular, when women were granted observer status, they could rarely influence the process. No patterns assessing the influence of women as observers emerged; rather, the way in which women were able to use observer status during negotiations varied according to a set of specific factors such as selection, influence on the negotiation delegations (mainly conflict parties), and coalition-building with groups outside of the negotiations to form a strategic alliance. Only in the case of Liberia (2003) were women observers influential, because they closely worked together with a strong women’s movement outside of the negotiations.

Modality 3: Consultations

Consultations may take place prior to, in parallel with, or after official negotiations (see Figure 3 above). Consultations can be elite-based, broad-based, or public. Any of these formats can be either an official part of the negotiation architecture or an informal initiative by one of the negotiating parties, by the mediator or the facilitator, or by groups wishing to influence the negotiations in some way.

Consultations can also be officially-endorsed, unofficial, or public. Officially-endorsed consultations aim to channel local people’s demands into a formal peace process, and to better understand how the public evaluates the substance of ongoing negotiations, including
what may be widely perceived as missing from the official agendas. This type of official consultation is often chosen when the official negotiation process design is exclusive, and negotiators and mediators recognize that public support is needed at a certain point in time. Unofficial consultations are sometimes used to generate pressure for the commencement of negotiations or in cases where the main parties refuse official consultations. Hence, they were found to occur most frequently in the pre-negotiation phase. Public consultations have also often been used to both disseminate the results of a negotiation process and to generate suggestions from the public. For the latter goal, collecting proposals and opinions from broader society is linked to the possibility that these recommendations will be added to the formal negotiation agenda (i.e. agenda-setting), as a means of developing public ownership of a peace process (i.e. boosting overall process legitimacy) and of furthering the long-term sustainability of a negotiated agreement. Public consultations have often been used to inform post-agreement commissions, and were therefore found to occur most frequently in the implementation phase.

In general, while official and unofficial consultations can be elite-based or representative to greater or lesser degrees, public consultations tend to always be broad-based and more representative. Public consultations have been conducted in many previous peace processes. For instance, various commissions addressing such issues as truth and reconciliation, transitional justice, constitutional drafting or reform, or aspects of monitoring, have tended to hold broad-based public consultations to inform their assessments.

Conducting consultations has the advantage of including a broad set of perspectives that confer greater legitimacy on the process, while at the same time avoiding the problem of unmanageable complexity (often cited by reluctant conflict parties or mediators faced with the prospect of broadening participation at the main negotiation table to include a larger number of actors). Consultations can also help facilitate discussion of difficult issues and provide an alternative channel for negotiations in the event that official negotiations stall. Consultative forums and processes also present an opportunity for groups to practice democratic procedures.

However, these advantages come at the price of distance from the formal negotiation table. Another risk is the possibility that the consultative forum may be co-opted by the main negotiators seeking to use civil society or others to promote their own negotiation agendas. Despite their mandate, they might still be ignored, sidelined, or dismissed by the principal negotiators. The participants of the forum might also fail to attain the desired cohesion and level of organization necessary for effectively influencing official negotiations.

Overall, the “Broadening Participation” research project found that consultation was the most common modality of inclusion in peace processes for all actors, including women’s groups. Even though most broad and public consultations included women, consultations that particularly targeted women were rare. In a few cases, special emphasis was put on improving understanding of the needs and demands of women.

For such consultations to be influential in practice, it is necessary to establish clear and effective transfer strategies that systematically communicate results of the consultations to negotiators and mediators. Overall, women were most influential within consultations when able to formulate a joint women’s position addressing important issues. Joint positions were then presented, often in concise documents, to explain women’s demands around particular issues to the main negotiating parties, which then were either formally obliged or informally pressured to consider this input in the drafting of a final peace agreement. For example, the Women’s National Coalition in South Africa (1990) conducted countrywide public consultations on women’s needs that directly fed into the publication of the Women’s Charter for Effective Equality. The Charter subsequently had a significant impact on equality provisions in the 1997 constitution.
Modality 4: Inclusive commissions

Inclusive commissions are most commonly found in the post-agreement stage, but they are occasionally used to set up or run part of the negotiation process. Setting up commissions and specific mechanisms for the implementation of a peace agreement is crucial for the future of a country. There are three types of commissions: a) commissions preparing/conducting a peace process; b) Post-agreement commissions such as transitional justice mechanisms, ceasefire monitoring, or constitution-drafting commissions; and c) commissions set up as permanent constitutional bodies like the inter-ethnic commission in Kyrgyzstan (2013) or the National Integration and Cohesion Commission in Kenya (2008), which both addressed equal rights for all ethnic groups in the country.

The presence of women in post-agreement commissions was mostly due to gender equality provisions (such as quotas) already written into the peace agreement. Especially when there are multiple selection criteria in addition to gender, securing women’s presence requires these gender equality provisions to be explicit. This also allows greater inclusion of highly qualified women into the process.

Overall, women were part of this modality of participation in all negotiation phases. However, exerting influence in commissions required women to get involved as early as possible. Securing women’s participation in all commissions across all phases of a peace process requires that explicit gender equality provisions (such as specific quotas) be introduced from the outset, in order to present in the language of a final peace agreement.

Modality 5: High-level problem-solving workshops (Track 1.5)

High-level problem-solving workshops bring together representatives close to the leaders of the conflict parties and offer them a space for discussion without the pressure to reach an agreement. They are unofficial and generally not publicized. Moreover, problem-solving workshops are meeting spaces that can last several years and are often organized and facilitated by INGOs or academic institutions (sometimes in cooperation with local partners). They also are an option when belligerents refuse to meet publicly (Paffenholz; 2014b). The “Broadening Participation” research project found that women were underrepresented in this modality. This pattern changed when the workshops were specifically designed for women’s groups as a means to overcome their own tensions and grievances. In this scenario, women were able to find joint positions and develop common statements that subsequently influenced negotiations or supported women’s inclusion. Women have participated in these workshops prior to, in parallel to, and/or after official negotiations, and they were able to successfully influence processes, such as in the case of the Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations in the DRC (2002). Importantly, the influence all actors can exert under this participation modality depends mainly on the availability of efficient and effective transfer strategies (see modality 3 above).

Modality 6: Public decision-making

Public decision-making processes are standard features of democracies. Peace agreements and/or new constitutions can be submitted for ratification by the population and the results are usually binding. A public endorsement of a peace deal also seeks to protect the negotiated agreement, provide democratic legitimacy to the process, and ensure public support and sustainability of the agreement.

The decision to put a negotiated peace deal to a public vote needs to be carefully considered. A vote against the agreement blocks its implementation and usually puts the entire process on hold. A number of peace agreements have been put to public referendum: in Cyprus (1999), for example, the UN-developed Annan Peace Plan was accepted overwhelmingly by Turkish Cypriots, while Greek Cypriots rejected the plan. The negative vote in one camp put the peace process on hold. In contrast, the 1998 referendum to ratify Northern Ireland’s Good Friday peace agreement was accepted.
Reliable, gender-disaggregated data is often missing or unable to be compiled, which poses difficulties in understanding women’s voting patterns. According to the Northern Ireland Life and Time Survey, a major annual social survey conducted since 1998, 71 per cent of men and 72 per cent of women claimed to have voted in favor of the Good Friday Agreement a year earlier. The same survey indicated that voter abstention was approximately equal between men (16 per cent) and women (18 per cent), which is roughly consistent with available data about the 81 per cent overall participation rate for both genders (implying a total abstention rate of 19 per cent). This indicates that, at least in Northern Ireland, women were not overwhelmingly more supportive of peace than men. In the case of Guatemala (1989), engagement with the peace process can only be indirectly inferred based on recorded participation rates in the 1999 Consulta Popular held to ratify the peace agreement. This is because no gender-disaggregated data on voter participation appears to exist. In this case, the participation rate of literate men was 41 per cent compared to the 28 per cent participation rate of literate women. The difference in turnout was narrower among illiterate voters, with 17 per cent of men and 14 per cent of women voting. Literate voters represented 69 per cent of the total voter turnout while illiterate voters represented 31 per cent. Female participation rates in Guatemalan elections tend to be much lower than those of men, reflecting a worldwide phenomenon of gender disparities in public sphere participation.

**BOX 5.3**

**Examples of Women Exerting Pressure on Men to Sign Peace Agreements**

Women are often credited with bringing about peace agreements and ensuring negotiations continue independent of specific agenda points. In a number of cases analyzed by the “Broader Participation” project, women have pushed for starting peace negotiations or for signing peace agreements. Our research shows that, in most cases with strong women’s involvement (15 out of 40), women specifically and successfully pushed for and supported the peace process. In particular, women’s participation through modalities 1 (direct representation), 2 (observer status), and 7 (mass action) seem to provide the most favorable entry points for their pro-peace activities.

For example, in the DRC (modality 1), the 40 female delegates in Sun City ensured that the agreement was signed by forming a human chain to block the exits to the committee room. They insisted that the men would not leave until the signing of the agreement. In the 1993 Conference of National Reconciliation in Somalia, some of the women observers (modality 2) at the conference decided to publicly pressure faction leaders by fasting until an agreement was reached. The men produced a peace plan 24 hours later. In Somaliland during the post-independence violence negotiations (1991-1994), women’s groups with observer status (modality 2) were highly influential in forcing the conflict parties to the table, and in keeping them there until concrete progress had been made. They also acted as de facto mediators and communicators. Because they were widely perceived as being more impartial than male colleagues, this trust allowed these observers to help facilitate the smooth progress of negotiations.

Similarly, in Liberia and Somaliland (modality 7), women outside the negotiation venue pressured the men to sign the agreement by threatening to publically undress themselves in full view of the negotiators. For a son to see his mother naked is especially inappropriate in that cultural context, and these women used and instrumentalized status quo gendered roles to advocate for peace. While these cases illustrate possibilities entailing direct physical proximity and access to negotiation venues, the case of Northern Ireland shows how women can also successfully mobilize for peace through a mass campaign (modality 7) that is much broader and all-encompassing in scope.
Modality 7: Mass action

Mass action by citizens mobilizes large numbers of people, mostly in the form of public demonstrations. As global events of the last decade have confirmed, mass action remains a very powerful instrument of public pressure on established powers and incumbent political elites, particularly when used effectively in combination with social media and mass media, such as live satellite broadcasts of mass actions. Most mass action is often the result of grassroots, bottom-up dynamics and centers on a common goal of national interest, such as political reforms to end authoritarian rule, the cessation of war and armed conflict, and/or the signing of a peace deal (Paffenholz, 2014b). In Nepal in 2006, for example, three months of mass demonstrations put pressure on the main conflict parties to end the war and make public commitments to end authoritarian rule, paving the way for the subsequent Comprehensive Peace Agreement. However, mass action does not have to be exclusively pro-peace; it can also be mobilized against peace agreements. For instance, in Sri Lanka in 2000, demonstrations against peace negotiations became more frequent and louder than pro-peace movements and they eventually put an end to the negotiations.

It is important to note that the “Broadening Participation” research project found no occasions where women’s groups organized mass action against a peace agreement. On the contrary, women have organized and performed mass action campaigns in favor of peace deals more than any other group. Women have often pressured conflict parties to start negotiations and sign peace deals.

On a few occasions, women’s groups effectively utilized mass action to pressure mediators and negotiation parties into granting them greater formal participation. In the case of Liberia, extensive demonstrations at key venues by the Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET) directly led to an invitation to the formal negotiations as observers. Whilst WIPNET ultimately turned this invitation down, it still increased their ability to influence the peace negotiations as they proceeded. Similarly, in Somaliland (1991), women’s groups regularly organized demonstrations at the negotiation venues. These actions by women’s groups brought them exposure and affected decisions to include them as observers in the eventual Boroma conference. Additionally, these actions helped them successfully voice demands that were substantially acknowledged in the creation of a national Guurtii (conference), which was then formalized in a national charter.

The case of Northern Ireland (see Box 6.9) illustrates how mass mobilization by women led to a positive outcome at the ballot boxes for the ratification of the peace agreement.
6. FACTORS ENABLING OR CONSTRAINING WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION AND INFLUENCE

There are a number of factors that may either enable or constrain the influence of women on peace and transition processes. These factors explain why or not women in past processes were able to assert influence on peace negotiations and their implementation. Maximizing those factors that enable, and overcoming those that constrain, is necessary to establish the conditions most conducive to facilitating meaningful participation by women’s groups and to achieving success in the peace process as a whole.

Overall, the “Broadening Participation” research project has identified two sets of factors: process and context factors. The first set of factors is related to how the process of inclusion is designed, while the second set of factors is related to the context in which this inclusion takes place.

This chapter first introduces and summarizes the nine process factors, and identifies their patterns across all seven inclusion modalities. Second, this chapter examines the context factors that not only have the potential to enable or constrain women’s participation, but also to influence whether a peace agreement itself is accepted and successfully implemented. Both sets of factors are equally important when addressing women’s inclusion: even a perfectly designed process can fail because contextual issues have not been properly addressed. Therefore, protecting the entire peace process as such becomes an important part of inclusive politics for peace.

Process factors
The nine most prominent process design factors affecting the ability of women to participate and influence peace negotiation processes are listed below in order of importance:

1. Selection criteria and procedures that include gender criteria;
2. Decision-making procedures that allow women to make use of their presence;
3. Coalitions and joint positions among participating women that enhance their influence;
4. Transfer strategies that allow women’s positions and inputs to reach the negotiation table, in particular in inclusion modalities farther from the table;
5. Conflict parties and mediators that are friendly to the inclusion of women;
6. Early involvement of women in the process;
7. Support structure for women prior to and during negotiations as well as for the implementation process;
8. Monitoring of women and gender provisions during implementation as well as monitoring of major gains in the peace process; and
9. Funding.
1. Selection criteria and procedures

Selection criteria and procedures are crucial to make all the phases of a peace process effective and legitimate. Not only do the selection criteria and procedures set the parameters of which actors are eligible to participate, they also provide details about the way the eligible actor will be chosen. They are one of the main determinants for ensuring women’s participation and constitute the pre-condition for participation in any of the inclusion modalities, especially at the negotiation table, when granted observer status, and in any formal or informal consultations and commissions. While ‘selection criteria’ define who is eligible to be included in a peace or transition process, ‘selection procedures’ refer to how eligible actors (i.e. actors qualified to participate on the basis of selection criteria) will then be chosen.

In principle, since both selection criteria and procedures determine who can participate in all relevant modalities, they are directly related to women’s inclusion in different peace process modalities throughout all phases. The “Broadening Participation” research project indicates that well-designed selection criteria and procedures are directly linked to the representativeness of participants, and particularly to the level of women’s influence in practice.

Those holding the power to nominate or invite participants often have the final say about women’s participation. Hence, women have been included in the different process modalities by different means, some more efficiently than others. For instance, at the negotiation table (where the power of conflict parties to select those allowed at the table is often problematic) women have gotten involved in official negotiations either as powerful members of their parties, such as prominent female politicians or military leaders, or more likely through gender-based quotas. Another example is when women acted as observers. During most peace processes, only conflict parties and mediators can nominate official observers. Hence, there often exist close ties between observers and the negotiating parties. This is the reason why some Liberian women during the 2003 peace process actively refused to participate as observers. Some women included as observers were the wives of generals, and were therefore accused of representing their respective parties’ interests rather than those of women at large. Meanwhile, in the case of consultations, the allocation of quotas has proven critical to ensure women’s involvement. In fact, women who made their way into consultative forums through quotas have shown to have a positive effect on the process (see Box 6.1).

Some selection criteria can also be detrimental to women’s participation. For example, women are under-represented in problem-solving workshops, possibly because the main selection criterion for these workshops is often ‘closeness to decision makers.’ The Congolese women-only problem-solving workshop was an exception, but served a different purpose of ironing out differences between women’s groups.

**BOX 6.1**

**Women Successfully Pushed for a Quota**

**Afghanistan Consultative Forum in Bonn, 2001**

In parallel to the 2001 Afghanistan negotiations held in Bonn, Germany, the UN in cooperation with two research institutions set up an official consultative forum. It comprised 35 per cent female delegates because the organizers pushed for it. The negotiations only lasted a week, meaning the Forum had to be prepared and conducted very quickly. This made it difficult for the diverse groups represented to arrive at a joint list of recommendations. However, the presence of so many women set a precedent for the process to come. The women present, among them strong youth group representatives, pushed successfully for the inclusion of a legislative gender quota and for women’s rights to be part of the agreement and the implementation process. This was crucial, as women’s representation was to be continuously challenged in the ensuing process. Being able to point to the explicit provisions in the Bonn agreement greatly supported women’s groups in their cause from agreement to implementation.
2. Decision-making

Decision-making has direct implications on the ability of women to exert influence. Decision-making procedures can make the crucial difference between nominal and meaningful participation and they are relevant across all seven modalities. In fact, even if women are included at the negotiation table in large numbers, without any explicit procedures authorizing them to influence the decision-making process, their opportunity to make an impact can be limited. For example, in the 15 out of 16 cases examined of national dialogue processes, the practice of widespread consultation with women’s groups frequently required the authorization of powerful, mainly male actors.

Women (as well as many civil society groups) were part of most working groups and sub-committees, but had little representation or power within the decision-making committees. Hence, being at the negotiation table is not enough to be able to exercise influence on the process. This is equally important in consultative forums and in post-agreement implementation commissions.

BOX 6.2
A High Quota but a Limited Decision-making Power

Constitutional Assembly in Nepal, 2008-2012

During the Constitutional Assembly (CA) in Nepal, despite a 33 per cent female quota, women were mostly excluded from decision-making processes. Decisions were made either under a majority-voting basis or behind closed doors. Senior political leaders used a lack of agreement in some of the crucial committees to justify overtaking the decision-making. The reports of contentious CA committees were forwarded to the Constitutional Committee within the CA. This meant there were no plenary discussions and none of the issues raised in the reports was voted on within the CA. Instead of discussing these options in plenary, they were discussed and decided on behind closed doors in high-level political meetings which were often kept secret even from fellow party members. Therefore, despite the unprecedented presence of women in the CA, they were not given the same opportunities as other constituencies in decision-making and therefore, saw the influence they exerted on the process limited.

3. Women’s Coalitions

Coalitions can take various forms, such as women’s groups cooperating under a unified representative banner or umbrella [such as in Liberia (2003), South Africa (1990), Kenya (2008), and Yemen (2013), a separate group or clan (such as the “sixth clan” in Somalia, 1999) a political party (such as in Northern Ireland, 1994), or an organized block across delegations during negotiations (DRC, 1999).

BOX 6.3
Problem-Solving Workshop to Prepare Women for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue

The Democratic Republic of Congo, 2002

The problem-solving workshop exclusively organized for women at the beginning of the Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations in the DRC in February 2002 provides an excellent example of how effective such workshops potentially can be. The workshop facilitated and organized by UNIFEM and local NGOs such as Femmes Africa Solidarité (Women as Partners for Peace in Africa) prepared 64 women for direct participation (modality 1, direct representation) at the peace talks in Sun City in South Africa. During this workshop where UNIFEM held crucial sessions on gender dimensions of reforms and effective participation, women agreed on a declaration and a plan of action. This also led to an increase in the number of women delegates.
When women have formed coalitions, mobilized around common issues, and appeared at the negotiation stage as a unified group, there was much greater chance of their voice being heard and acknowledged. To achieve such cohesion, women inevitably had to overcome their differences, which was not unusual given that diverse women’s groups often held nuanced and differentiated political preferences. The process of building coalitions and overcoming dividing grievances was sometimes supported by strong, respected women leaders from within the country, but more often from outside, in particular strong women mediators. Problem-solving workshops and other preparatory meetings also helped women to find joint positions (see Box 6.3). Women’s coalitions therefore, were able to make concise demands and concrete proposals, the majority of which were consequently incorporated into final agreements.

The visibility of a unified women’s movement also facilitated meaningful contact and cooperation with formal mediation teams. When women jointly pushed for the commencement of negotiations or the signing of agreements they had a very high success rate, as seen prominently in the DRC, Liberia, Somalia, Northern Ireland, and Papua New Guinea/Bougainville (see Box 6.4).

Significantly, the “Broadening Participation” research project found that women’s coalitions have pushed for agreements to be signed more often than any other group of actors. Women’s coalitions or networks have also been successful at strategically sending their representatives as delegates within other delegations.

In addition, women’s groups as observers have used their presence inside the negotiations to inform women outside of the negotiation. This cooperation

BOX 6.4
Unified Women or Heterogeneous Groups?


Although from very different backgrounds, women delegates in the DRC managed to overcome their differences. They formed a women’s caucus, agreed on issues they all cared about and produced a comprehensive joint document (The Nairobi Declaration and Plan of Action). This document presented statements and demands for all women. Thereafter, the women sent their delegates into each commission like the other parties. At the time of the signing of the Final Act in Sun City in April 2003, there were 40 women delegates (out of 340). Although it was a very small group of decision-makers in the end, it was the women who made sure that the agreement was signed at all. As mentioned above, the female delegates formed a human chain, blocking the exits of the committee room until the men signed the agreement.

In Yemen, on the other hand, the women technically had an immense veto power thanks to the 30 per cent quota applied throughout the 2013 National Dialogue Conference, and the 40 guaranteed seats out of 565 for women as an independent constituency. However, they did not form a unified group and voted rarely as a block. They hardly ever rallied together around issues that affected them as a whole group (such as the issue of child brides) and therefore did not really make use of their veto power.

The 1999 Somalia peace negotiations in Djibouti were organized on the basis of a clan system, with decision-making power distributed according to the country’s clan structure. Arranged in this way, the negotiations effectively excluded the concerns and voices of any actor or group not representing clan interests. Recognizing this exclusion and its potential harm to the peace process and Somali society, 92 of the 100 women present unilaterally formed an alternative coalition and broke away from clan lines. Agreeing to vote as a single block not in the interests of their respective clans, this self-proclaimed women’s ‘sixth clan’ introduced an entirely novel and gender-based aspect to the negotiations. This action led to the unprecedented 10 per cent women’s quota in the Transitional National Assembly.
pushed the signing of the peace agreement as it can be seen in the case of Liberia 2003-2011 (see Box 6.5).

4. Transfer strategies
Transfer strategies play an essential role in ensuring that women’s inputs find their way into agreements and peace processes as a whole. Generally speaking, transfer is particularly important when it comes to modalities further away from the negotiation table, such as consultations, commissions, or informal problem-solving workshops. In practice, such modalities rely heavily on transfer strategies to influence the negotiations.

Transfer mechanisms may take the form of either insider or outsider strategies. Insider strategies include handing over reports and non-papers to negotiators or mediators; direct exchange with mediators, advisors, and negotiators; the participation of mediators in consultations or problem-solving workshops. Outsider strategies include public reports or declarations; media

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**BOX 6.5**

**Effective Women’s Cooperation in Observer Roles**

**Liberia, 2003 - 2011**

In the 2003 – 2011 peace process in Liberia, women’s groups employed cooperation to great effect, enhancing the role of women as observers, but also across other modalities. Two prominent women’s groups, the Mano River Women’s Peace Network (MARWOPNET) and the Women in Peace Network (WIPNET) were both highly active during the process. Charles Taylor authorized the participation of MARWOPNET, and thus they were included at the table, but suffered from accusations of being partial. WIPNET, on the other hand, were largely seen as independent and conducted a number of high profile, effective, and influential actions away from the table. Indeed, such was WIPNET’s influence that they were later invited to become official observers. Wishing to keep their options open and remain clear of the accusations leveled at MARWOPNET, WIPNET declined the invitation and continued campaigning via other modalities. Importantly, despite different sites and modalities of inclusion, the two groups coordinated to push unified aims. Thus, there was a largely unified women’s agenda able to reap the benefits of combined insider and outsider status.

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**BOX 6.6**

**Examples of Joint Women’s Declarations**

A successful transfer strategy used by women’s networks and coalitions is the creation of a common document expressing a unified position that can be handed to the mediation and negotiation teams. In the DRC (1999), women’s groups drafted a declaration and an associated plan of action that was handed to the facilitator. In Kenya (2008), a women’s memorandum was also handed to the African Union panel and most of its provisions found their way into the final agreement. Similarly, in Liberia (2003), women wrote the so-called ‘Golden Tulip Declaration’ to publicize and push their position. In South Africa (1990), the National Women’s Coalition after extensive research produced the Women’s Charter for Effective Equality, which had significant influence on the content of the constitution, law and policy. In all these cases, the content of the documents addressed the roots of the conflict, but also made specific reference to gender provisions and women’s rights. Most of the provisions in those documents were transferred in some form into the final act, agreement, or constitution.
outreach; public statements; press releases; visible peace messages; and lobbying for international or regional community attention.

The “Broadening Participation” research project found that there were several key transfer strategies particularly utilized by women. In the cases of the DRC (1999), Kenya (2008), Liberia (2003), and Somalia (1999), unofficial or semi-formal meetings with mediators and facilitators were employed. Women’s groups also often raised awareness for their issues through public announcements, mass action and media attention, as was the case in Guatemala (1989), Liberia (2003), Mexico (1994), Northern Ireland (1994), Somaliland (1991), Somalia (1999 & 2001), and Yemen (2013).

**Comparative research highlighted that the creation of a common document was an especially successful transfer strategy in gaining influence.** Particularly when used in conjunction with public outreach campaigns, the existence of a physical written document enhanced the influence of women in peace processes. In all cases, the content of these documents addressed the roots of the conflict and also made specific demands for women’s rights and gender provisions to be included in the final agreement or constitution. Women in Burundi (1996), DRC (1999), Guatemala (1989), Kenya (2008), Mexico (1994), Liberia (2003), and Somalia (2001) all submitted documents containing concrete requests and clear recommendations for gender-sensitive implementation processes or women-specific issues to be included in the peace agreement.

Overall, in all cases where agreements were reached and women had a significant role in this outcome, a mix of insider and outsider transfer strategies was applied.

**5. Attitude of conflict parties and mediators**

Conflict parties and mediators friendly to women’s inclusion were found to be a major enabling factor for women’s inclusion. Overall, the disposition and capability of mediators—including having a good understanding of the function and importance of women, gender concerns and broader inclusion—can significantly affect women’s inclusion, both in

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**BOX 6.7**

**The Role of Graça Machel in Pushing for Women’s Influence**

**Kenya 2007**

When violence broke out after contested election results at the end of 2007, a number of Nairobi-based female professionals from all different political and geographical areas working in peace, human rights, development and humanitarian organizations came together to assess potential areas of contribution for women to address the crisis. A core group of three women sent out invitations to all women’s organizations in the country. Different meetings and consultations were held comprised of between 10 and 200 women. Graça Machel’s presence as mediator next to Kofi Annan in the African Union (AU) Panel was crucial for the women. It required the impetus of Graça Machel for women to overcome their own differences and divisions in order to work together to press for greater focus on women’s issues in the process. Graça Machel advised the group to unite on common grounds, put aside political differences, and come up with a memorandum to the African Union Panel with women’s concerns and recommendations. Their recommendations resonated with critical issues for all of society at large.

A team of 12 women presented the Women’s Memorandum to the AU Panel. Kofi Annan invited the women to a feedback session after the first peace agreement was signed and asked them what other issues needed to be addressed in the next round of negotiations and in the next agreements. The women had also prepared a second memorandum for this feedback session. Informal exchanges between the women and the mediation team continued thereafter.
terms of enabling and supporting their presence and influence. Conversely, inexperience, resistance, or indifference on the part of mediators and leaders was found to constrain the presence and influence possibilities of women. A mediator can strategically use his or her role by displaying flexibility, being open for inclusion, and finding alternative ways to channel the voices of included actors into a process.

The research project also found that experienced senior women mediators with a strong understanding of gender can be very effective in support of women as seen with Graça Machel in the 2008 Kenyan negotiations (see Box 6.7). Strong and supportive guidance by these female mediators and women leaders also played a decisive role in supporting women during peace processes. However, despite the importance of female mediators in initiating and supporting women’s inclusion, the international community still consistently selects men for mediation positions. Of all the chief mediators selected in contemporary peace processes, only 2.4 per cent of them have been female (UN WOMEN 2012:b). Nevertheless, male mediators have also pushed for the inclusion of women in previous cases, as seen in Yemen, Darfur, Guatemala, and the DRC.

Key peacemakers were not necessarily members of mediation teams. In several cases these were strong, well-known and well-established women leaders who not only pushed for women’s inclusion but also helped women to overcome differences and form a coalition or network with a unifying program. In the Papua New Guinea-Bougainville peace negotiations, Sister Loraine Garasu played a crucial role as the main face and voice of the “Women of Bougainville”. In the DRC, Ruth Perry, the former President of Liberia (1996-1997), pushed women to come up with a joint document and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf played an important role by leading the social, cultural, and humanitarian commission. In Kenya (2008), Florence Mpaai, an experienced peacemaker in other African countries and the then Director of Nairobi Peace Initiative, was among the key initiators of the women’s coalition. In general, these women seemed to have relevant experience either from other peace processes or from long term experience in dispute resolution in their respective country context.

6. Early involvement of women in the process

The research project found that when women were involved early in the process, a precedent was set for the inclusion of women that continued throughout the entire negotiation and implementation process. It also increased their ability to make substantive contributions. Women included during the pre-negotiation and the actual negotiation phase (often through quotas) found that their participation was also sustained during the implementation phase and even in post-agreement political institutions. Further and more specifically, whenever women’s participation was already mentioned in a ceasefire or in a previous agreement, this helped to have them included in the main peace negotiations or political transition negotiations. However, when there was no explicit mentioning of their participation in earlier agreements, they had to intensify their lobbying efforts drastically in order to be accepted as participants.

7. Support structures for women

The “Broadening Participation” research project found that support structures allowed women to be more effective in making differentiated and quality contributions, and strengthened their role and influence during negotiations or implementation. These structures can be built into the negotiation process, provided through outside-facilitated arrangements, or both. Overall, the findings show that women benefitted more from targeted support structures than other included actors, and such support structures prior to, during, and after negotiations were found to substantially enhance their influence.

Key structures for women were resource centers established during negotiations offering technical support like computers and internet access, and providing gender and other content-specific expertise (See Box 6.8). Other support structures were workshops, and training sessions that addressed specific issues needed during the talks. Not only did these structures increase the overall preparedness of women, they often contributed to women’s pushing for more gender-specific goals.
8. Monitoring

The implementation of peace process decisions and peace agreement provisions cannot be taken for granted. Monitoring was found to be critical, but was also ultimately found to be weak. Even in the strong cases (i.e. when women had a lot of influence in the peace agreement and were able to include many provisions and secure a gender quota for key implementation bodies), monitoring of the implementation of these achievements was rarely conducted. Internationally, there is also a crucial lack of systematic data available. While the UN has monitored the number of women mediators and negotiators as well as the amount of gender provisions in peace agreements for some years now, there remains no monitoring on the implementation of these provisions. There is also little funding provided to women’s groups earmarked for the monitoring of peace agreement implementation in general, and on women and gender provisions in particular. Moreover, women’s coalitions often dissolve, become inactive, or become service-provider NGOs after peace agreements are signed. As a consequence, it is often hard to mobilize women to effectively respond if the major reforms and gains of the peace agreement are not properly implemented.

9. Funding

Funding is a means to facilitate action. It matters for all inclusion modalities and all phases of the peace process, but becomes particularly problematic for informal inclusion modalities. Funding can support the preparedness of women, provide beneficial support structures, and allow them to act flexibly and independently. Funding is vital for the basic preconditions of participation. For instance, with peace processes often taking place in varied and distant venues, it can be difficult or impossible to physically reach the locations of negotiations or lobby the process in person without proper financial means.

Funding for informal consultation modalities is more of a problem compared to other forms of consultations or modalities. For example, in the Somalia peace negotiations in the early 1990s, the Swedish Life and Peace Institute provided financial and logistical support to local and diaspora women’s groups to be able to attend important meetings and be present during the negotiations. This allowed women’s voices to be heard and to lobby for their inclusion. An almost identical example can be found in the Liberian peace process at the negotiations on the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2003). The Women in Peace Network (WIPNET) were constrained by lack of funds and were unable to mobilize campaigns abroad, until they managed to secure additional funding from the West Africa Network for Peace Building (WANEP), a regional peace network, which in turn allowed them to maintain presence and pressure on the process.

Context Factors

This section highlights the nine context factors identified in the “Broadening Participation” research project that enable or constrain women’s inclusion, but also protect or threaten the peace process writ
large. Of the context factors listed below, the first three are crucial political context factors, relevant in protecting the entire peace process and affecting all actors, while the remaining six are specific to women.

1. Elite resistance or support
2. Public buy-in
3. Regional and international actors’ influence on peace processes
4. Presence of strong women’s groups
5. Preparedness of women
6. Heterogeneity of women’s identities
7. Attitudes and expectations surrounding societal gender roles
8. Regional and international women’s networks
9. Existence of prior commitments or gender provisions

**Elite resistance or support**

Elite resistance or support is one of the most decisive factors in determining the outcomes of a peace process. Inclusive peace processes challenge established power structures and threaten to undermine the access of elites and conflict parties to future governance. Accordingly, the resistance of these actors towards processes of change was found to be considerable, varying from open to more tacit forms of resistance.

Elites are often close to the government, as economic and political power is closely intertwined. In such cases, the resistance of elites is particularly problematic when negotiations aim at achieving a political transition. Indeed, elites would be likely to fight any changes in their status and in the composition of the government and of society more generally. For example, in almost all cases featuring military governments, inclusive constitution-making and other political reform processes were suspended or halted when the outcome of these processes did not match the interests of the government. Togo (1990) presents a clear example of this phenomenon, where the then-dictator Eyadéma was forced by mounting public pressure to agree to a national dialogue process and a new constitution. Although he made these concessions, Eyadéma ultimately cancelled the entire political reform process when it became clear that the outcomes would challenge his rule. Similar examples can be found in Fiji, Egypt, and Eritrea.

Civilian governments were less open in their resistance to major changes presented by peace process agreements, but it was still not uncommon for them to undermine major peace process gains, by for example, not implementing substantial provisions of the agreement, or simply not nominating commissioners to important post-agreement bodies. In contrast, when incumbent political elites are supportive of peace processes, major reforms can be more easily pushed through and sustained over time.

Elite support or resistance also plays a role when it comes to broader inclusion and to women’s inclusion in particular. The research project found that conflict parties and other elites were highly likely to attempt to ‘capture’ selection criteria and decision-making procedures in order to enhance their own positions and negate the positions of other groups.

**Public buy-in**

The level of public buy-in for a peace process—and any subsequent negotiated peace agreement or new constitution—is an essential determinant of success or failure of the entire peace process. Research found that a lack of public support makes it very difficult to implement an agreement. This factor is generally influenced by the political climate in a country and the extent to which powerful actors support the peace process. However, public buy-in can also be created, and actors can devise strategies to enhance public support and generate momentum behind their preferences. This was the case in Northern Ireland where, in the run up to the referendum over the Good Friday Peace Agreement (1998), a massive civil society campaign managed to push for a positive outcome of the referendum. The Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition was in the forefront supporting this campaign (see Box 6.9).
The influence of powerful regional actors is decisive for peace and transition processes and has often been more important than the role of international actors. For example, the role of the European Union (EU) in the Cyprus conflict was more important than the UN peace plan. Likewise, the role of India in the Nepali conflict was exceedingly influential—the withdrawal of Indian support for the Nepalese government was a decisive factor enabling the civil society movement to have greater impact. Dependent on the context, regional actors in peace processes—be it as mediators, groups of friends, observers, or even parties to the negotiations—can be highly relevant to ensuring participation of women.

Box 6.9
Preparing for the Referendum: the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition

Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement

In 1996, the negotiators of the Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement (GFA) invited the top ten political parties to the negotiating table. None of them had female representation. When they realized this, Monica McWilliams and May Blood formed the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC) and managed to secure the 10,000 signatures required to form a political party, thus gaining a seat for women at the negotiation table.

The position presented by the NIWC during the negotiations emphasized that the solutions to Northern Ireland’s problems lay in collective and shared approaches. The NIWC therefore built bridges between the Protestant and Catholic communities, and they believed that the ownership of the terms of any agreement should not be solely in the hands of those sitting around the table. Rather, these terms also needed to be communicated to and owned by those excluded from, or on the margins of, the political process.

The NIWC were highly involved in the drafting of the GFA and had a strong popular mandate. Their stance on the need for participatory and inclusive politics shaped their active participation during the referendum on the GFA, and they are widely credited with playing a critical role in the promotion of the YES campaign before the referendum. They were able to successfully mobilize people, and frame a YES vote as a sign of progress, as opposed to backwardness signaled by voting NO. According to many observers, the success of the campaign and outcome of the referendum can be directly attributed to the persistent efforts and proactive nature of the NIWC.

Regional and international actors’ influence

Presence of strong women’s groups

When strong women’s groups, networks, or movements are already active in a country prior to negotiations, this can enhance women’s influence during a process. Pre-existing groups, networks, and movements resulted in women being able to draw upon existing experience and resources to push for women’s inclusion through mass action, facilitate the start of negotiations, and raise the funds necessary for continued involvement. The strength of women’s groups can also be increased through regional and international women’s networks.

Strength of existing women’s civil society organizations

In cases where women’s groups already had significant experience and substantive expertise, where they were previously capable of efficient organization and mobilization, it was found that these groups exerted more influence on the process. This was related to previous organizational experience of involved women’s groups, and the existence of a general culture or tradition of strong civil society organizations in a specific national context. A good example of this is found in South...
Africa where the first women’s organization was established as early as 1911 and where, through the 1980s, a rise of unifying, non-racial women’s organizations formed to work against apartheid.

Heterogeneity of women’s identities
The heterogeneity of women’s identities often helped women to influence processes, but was also found to sometimes work against them. Gender is only one of a range of salient identity characteristics, though it intersects with and thus shapes other identities as well. For example, a woman participating in a national dialogue in her capacity as a young person may also represent a faith, a regional grouping, or a political party. This can lead to a problematic perception that actors included under one identity are being used to stack the negotiations with supporters of a particular constituency. However, including women is not a synonym for gender or one axis of identity. Overcoming divisions can be assisted by the following process factors: coalition building, role of mediators, and availability of adequate support structures.

Attitudes and expectations surrounding societal gender roles
Social attitudes and expectations surrounding gender roles can influence how difficult or easy it is to achieve women’s inclusion. In cases where women had a recognized mediation role in society, like in Papua New Guinea/Bougainville (1997), they were invited to participate and could more easily assert influence. In Yemen, women’s political participation was a very contentious issue and the fundamentalist movements against women’s rights were fairly strong. Consequently, female participants were threatened, sexually harassed and assaulted for participating in the national dialogue process that began in 2013. Similarly, in the DRC (1999) and Afghanistan (2001), female delegates were intimidated and harassed by the main conflict parties. These parties questioned the legitimacy of the women participating. In South Africa (1990), social attitudes towards gender roles underpinned why traditional leaders were against equality provisions in the Bill of Rights resulting from the political transition process.

Regional and international women’s networks
When regional and international women’s networks supported local groups, it had a positive effect on enabling and strengthening these groups. For example, in the 2003-2011 Liberian peace process, women’s networks were able to organize a mass mobilization outside of the peace negotiations in neighboring Sierra Leone, primarily due to the support of a regional women’s network also active in Sierra Leone. Members of the network hosted the Liberian women and provided logistical and other forms of support. As noted above, such networks can increase the strength of domestic women’s groups.

Existence of prior commitments or gender provisions
The existence of prior commitments on the inclusion of women turned out to be a strong factor determining future involvement of women’s groups. The fact that these provisions existed gave women a claim to the process, and made it harder for other actors to exclude them entirely. For example, the transitional governance agreement for Yemen brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in November 2011 already announced that women were to be part of the upcoming National Dialogue Conference (2013-2014). Similarly, the 2001 Bonn Afghanistan peace agreement explicitly mentioned the participation of women in the constitution-making process set to follow the agreement. In the constitution-making processes in South Africa, Nepal and Yemen, strict women quotas were established for participating delegations prior to the start of the Dialogues. The 2008 Kenyan and the 2003-2011 Liberian peace agreements were also very specific about the gender-balanced composition of post-agreement implementation commissions.
CONCLUSIONS

Overall, the “Broadening Participation” research project’s results show that even if women’s inclusion is still challenged or met with indifference by many negotiation parties and mediators, women have managed to make substantial contributions to peacemaking and constitution-making negotiations, and to the eventual implementation of negotiated agreements. However, more importantly, examination of the case studies reveals that a strong presence of women, even directly at the negotiation table, does not automatically translate into their ability to assert a strong influence. It is the level of influence that women can assert on the process that makes a difference, not only their presence by numbers.

This research project found that where women were able to exercise strong influence on a negotiation process, the chances of agreements being reached and implemented were much higher than when women’s groups exercised moderate, weak, or no influence. Most importantly, this research project identified a number of key process and context factors that enable or constrain the inclusion of women, as well as their ability to exercise influence in all inclusion modalities across tracks and phases of a peace process (see chapter 6).

The research project also found that there is an over-focus on women’s inclusion into official negotiation delegations during peace talks. This obscures the fact that early women’s involvement, preferably already in the pre-negotiation phase, has often paved the way for sustained women’s inclusion throughout the negotiations and the implementation process. This finding echoes UN Security Council Resolution 1889 (2009) and its emphasis on including women in decision-making at the earliest stages in peace and post-conflict processes [SCR 1889 (2009) preamble, para 1, para 15].

Despite the findings on the importance of women’s inclusion, women are still underrepresented in peace processes. Women’s inclusion is still only seen as a normative obligation, rather than a beneficial or necessary feature of peace processes. Women and their international supporters are often required to lobby hard for women’s inclusion. Furthermore, women’s inclusion is not just limited to the negotiation table. Women’s groups have not only successfully influenced peace agreements at the negotiation table, they have also done so through consultations prior to and during negotiations, and often very effectively through mass action. In all cases where an agreement was reached and implemented, and where women wielded significant influence, this was exercised across different modalities and tracks, and was directly related to bringing about successful outcomes in the process.

In relation to women’s direct representation at the negotiation table, women-only delegations had greater overall influence on the process than individual women within other official negotiation delegations—even when they constituted a significant part of that delegation. In many cases where women were represented in high numbers across negotiation delegations, they could only make effective use of their relatively high presence by transcending the lines of their respective delegations and forming coalitions for the attainment of common interests. This mostly occurred when women jointly pressured inside or and outside of the negotiations for the signing of an agreement.

When women had observer status, they rarely had influence when they were closely connected to and had influence on conflict parties. At the same time, such close affiliation often challenged their legitimacy.
Women have also been influential outside of formal negotiations. In consultations, women were influential mostly when they were able to formulate a joint women’s position, commonly presented in concise documents spelling out women’s demands. Such documents were often instrumental in transferring demands onto the negotiation table and into agreements. Facilitation by strong and individually influential women from inside or outside of the country often helped women overcome differences and reach joint positions (this also holds true for women at the table). In addition, successful transfer from consultations to the table was most effective when supported by combining supplementary factors and strategies, such as close cooperation with mediators and negotiation delegations, lobbying with regional and international actors and organizations, and targeted media outreach and public campaigns (see the discussion of transfer strategies, Chapter 6).

The presence of women in post-agreement commissions took place mostly due to gender-sensitive provisions already written into the peace agreement. The more explicit these provisions for gender equality, the higher the likelihood of future women’s presence in later commissions and mechanisms, especially when there were multiple selection criteria in addition to gender quotas, such as ethnicity, geography, religious affiliation, expertise in one subject matter, among others. In addition, these expanded criteria also enabled the greater inclusion of highly qualified women in the process. However, the pro-gender results of many commissions often went unimplemented as they were frequently dependent on the support of (unsympathetic) political elites. Women and their supporters—like other actors such as civil society groups—have not paid sufficient attention to the political context of the work of these highly important commissions. Again, this has also been due to a lack of adequate monitoring.

In High-Level Problem-Solving Workshops (Track 1.5) women were highly underrepresented overall. This differed only when these workshops were specifically designed for women as a means to overcome their tensions and grievances and develop joint positions. These consequent joint women’s statements were able to influence negotiations when the transfer was organized strategically in the same fashion as for consultations. These workshops had sometimes a direct enabling effect on women participating in the negotiations, or even enabled greater women’s inclusion.

In relation to public decision-making, voting patterns of women (where available) have not been hugely different from those of men. In the case of referendums designed to ratify agreements, there is not an automatic public dispensation in favor of peace agreements. However, as the case of Northern Ireland demonstrates, women have been successful in launching public campaigns in favor of approving a peace deal.

Women excel in mass action. Women are often credited for bringing about peace agreements and ensuring the continuation of negotiations independent of specific agenda points. The case studies demonstrate that women have – more than any other group – performed mass action in favor of peace deals. In fact, the cases where women performed joint civil resistance and mass action encouraging men to start negotiations or sign peace agreements demonstrate that pushing for peace has been the big uniting factor for otherwise divided women. Mass action thereby supported women’s action in other inclusion modalities. In most case studies featuring strong women’s involvement (13 out of 40), women specifically and successfully pushed for peace and the signature of a peace agreement in particular. However, there has not been a single case of women (or other) mass action during implementation when important reforms initiated by the peace agreement were not implemented. Mass mobilization and mass action by women before and during negotiations can also serve as a direct legitimizing factor leading to women being subsequently invited to participate in the official process.
## ANNEX 1: LIST OF CASE STUDIES

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Aceh Peace Negotiation 1999-2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Afghanistan Negotiations and Political Transition 2001-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Benin Political transition 1990-2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Cyprus Negotiations 1999-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Darfur Peace Negotiations 2009-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Egypt Political Transition 2011-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Fiji Political Transition/Constitution making 2006-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Israel-Palestine Geneva Initiative 2003-2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Kenya Post-election violence 2008-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan political reforms 2013-preset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Good Friday 2001-2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>PNG Bougainville Peace Negotiations 1997-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>Somalia Djibouti process 1999-2001</td>
</tr>
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<td>34.</td>
<td>South Africa Political Transition 1990-1997</td>
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<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>Sri Lanka Ceasefire, Peace Negotiation and Elections 2000-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>Tajikistan peace negotiations and impl.1993-2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>Togo political transition 1990-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38.</td>
<td>Turkey Armenia protocols 2008-2011</td>
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</table>
ANNEX 2: BROADENING PARTICIPATION PROJECT RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

The table below summarizes the Broadening Participation project research framework.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Modalities</th>
<th>Assessing modalities in 40 case studies</th>
<th>Assessing impact during phases and level of influence</th>
<th>Analysing causation: Enabling and constraining factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- History</td>
<td>1. Direct representation at the table</td>
<td>• Model frequency</td>
<td>• Phases/category</td>
<td>• Context related</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- State-society relations</td>
<td>• Within delegations</td>
<td>• Duration</td>
<td>• Start of Negotiations</td>
<td>• Process design related</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Political, economic and social context</td>
<td>• Enlarging the number of delegations</td>
<td>• Included actors</td>
<td>• Negotiation Agenda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Military</td>
<td>• National Dialogues</td>
<td>• Rationale</td>
<td>• Negotiation Outcome</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Women/gender in society</td>
<td>2. Observer status</td>
<td>• Producers, including decision-making</td>
<td>• Peace Agreement</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Role of media</td>
<td>3. Consultations</td>
<td>• Selection</td>
<td>• Constitution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Conflicts + causes</td>
<td>• Inclusive commissions</td>
<td>• Transfer</td>
<td>• Political Reforms</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Peace/Transition process</td>
<td>• Post-agreement</td>
<td>• Initiation</td>
<td>• Implementation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Actors (national, international)</td>
<td>• Pre- or during negotiations</td>
<td>• Mediator’s role</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Permanent bodies</td>
<td>• Role of other actors</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>4. High-level problem-solving workshops</td>
<td>• Degree of political support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>5. Public decision-making</td>
<td>• Funding</td>
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<td></td>
<td>6. Mass action</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Quantitative analysis</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Correlation between types of influence and outcomes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Frequency analyses</td>
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</table>
# ANNEX 3: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS WORKSHOP JANUARY 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Danielle Goldberg</td>
<td>Global Network of Women Peace builders (GNWP)</td>
<td>Program Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbro Svedberg</td>
<td>Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)</td>
<td>Project Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rachel Gasser</td>
<td>Swiss Peace</td>
<td>Deputy Head, Mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amel Gorani</td>
<td>HD Centre</td>
<td>Inclusion Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madeline Koch</td>
<td>International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN)</td>
<td>Programme Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanam Anderlini</td>
<td>International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN)</td>
<td>Co-Founder, Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bandana Rana</td>
<td>Saathi</td>
<td>Executive President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marie O’Reilly</td>
<td>International Peace Institute (IPI)</td>
<td>Editor and Research Fellow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rina Amiri</td>
<td>United Nations Mediation Support Unit, Standby Team</td>
<td>Gender and Inclusion Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isabelle Geuskens</td>
<td>Women Peacemakers Programme</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michelle Barsa</td>
<td>Institute for Inclusive Security</td>
<td>Deputy Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katarina Salmela</td>
<td>UN Women</td>
<td>Policy Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corneliike Keizer</td>
<td>CORDAID</td>
<td>Partnership Development Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madeleine Rees</td>
<td>Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrea O’Suilleabhin</td>
<td>International Peace Institute (IPI)</td>
<td>Senior Policy Analyst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kathrin Quesada</td>
<td></td>
<td>Researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jana Naujoks</td>
<td>International Alert</td>
<td>Senior Programme Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anna Wildt</td>
<td>Swiss MFA, Human Security Division</td>
<td>Gender Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stefan Ott</td>
<td>Swiss MFA, Human Security Division</td>
<td>Intern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christine Bell</td>
<td>Edinburgh Law School</td>
<td>Professor of Constitutional Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thania Paffenholz</td>
<td>Graduate Institute/CCDP</td>
<td>Project Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mireille Widmer</td>
<td>Graduate Institute/CCDP</td>
<td>Policy Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuija Talvitie</td>
<td>CMI</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonia Potter Prentice</td>
<td>CMI</td>
<td>Senior Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silja Grundström</td>
<td>CMI</td>
<td>Project Officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. ADDITIONAL REFERENCES TO THE CASE STUDIES USED


UN WOMEN IS THE UN ORGANIZATION DEDICATED TO GENDER EQUALITY AND THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN. A GLOBAL CHAMPION FOR WOMEN AND GIRLS, UN WOMEN WAS ESTABLISHED TO ACCELERATE PROGRESS ON MEETING THEIR NEEDS WORLDWIDE.

UN Women supports UN Member States as they set global standards for achieving gender equality, and works with governments and civil society to design laws, policies, programmes and services needed to implement these standards. It stands behind women’s equal participation in all aspects of life, focusing on five priority areas: increasing women’s leadership and participation; ending violence against women; engaging women in all aspects of peace and security processes; enhancing women’s economic empowerment; and making gender equality central to national development planning and budgeting. UN Women also coordinates and promotes the UN system’s work in advancing gender equality.